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THE INTER-ENTERPRISE DEBT EXPLOSION IN THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CURES
Jacek Rostowski1
1.  INTRODUCTION
Inter-enterprise debt (IED) has long been perceived to be a problem in market
socialist economies , and it has resurfaced as an acute anxiety for policy makers in2
many Post-Communist Economies attempting to implement so-called "big bang"
liberalization/stabilization programmes. However, it is in the states of the former
Soviet Union (FSU) that the phenomenon has attained truly epic proportions.
Between 1 January and 30 April 1992 IED in Russia grew from a few dozen billion
rubles to 1,800 billion rubles, the equivalent of total GNP generated in the first four
months of the year . Roughly the same relationship of IED/GDP held in Latvia in3
June 1992. This suggests that in both countries about half of transactions were not
being paid for . By end-June the stock of IED in Russia had reached 3,000 billion4
rubles. In Romania at the end of 1991, IED amounted to about 50% of GNP [Khan
and Clifton 1992]. On the other hand, in the Central European PCEs the ratio of IED
to GNP is much smaller, and seems to have increased at a far slower rate - or not at
all - upon initiation of "big bangs". Thus in Czecho-Slovakia IED constituted about
18% of GDP at the end of 1991 , a level to which it had merely doubled from the5
beginning of the year (Table 4). In Poland at the end of 1989 IED/GDP ratio was also
around 18%, after which it declined (see Table 3) .6
2.  THE CAUSES OF INTER-ENTERPRISE DEBT EXPLOSION
2As Begg and Portes [1992] point out, the ratio of IED to bank credit in Central
European PCEs is not out of line with that in advanced capitalist countries, where the
two categories of credit are roughly of equal size. This is the case in Poland, whereas
in Czecho-Slovakia the IED/bank credit ratio only reached 25% at end 1991, although
it was rising quite rapidly. In Poland during 1991 the average period of payment
delay was 62 days [GUS 1991], whereas the corresponding figure in the West ranges
from 45 days in Germany and Scandinavia, through 80 days in the UK to 90 in Italy
and 110 in France . Under central planning IED was strictly controlled by the7
authorities and severely discouraged as a symptom of enterprise independence. It is
therefore clear that an important reason for IED growth in Central European PCEs
is adjustment to levels suitable for market economies.
Begg and Portes suggest further micro-economic reasons for IED growth in
PCEs: First, enterprises with liquid assets and low costs of monitoring other
enterprises in their own sector may effectively join the banking business by extending
credit to their customers (interest, often at penal rates, is due on payments delayed
beyond the credit days granted by the seller) . Second, taking action against debtors8
may signal to one's creditors that one is oneself in financial difficulties. Third, there
is an option value in waiting before closing down a major customer - his financial
health may improve. The last two are reasons for what Begg and Portes call "creditor
passivity", which can be perfectly rational in such circumstances.
However, these explanations, although they may contribute to the
phenomenon, cannot - severally or jointly - be adequate to account for the difference
in the magnitude of the IED explosion in the FSU and Romania as compared to the
Central European PCEs. First, as described in the previous section, the magnitude of
3IED is of a different order in the FSU and Romania . Second, the growth rate of IED9
has also been much greater. IED increased by about 130% in nominal terms and 50%
in real terms in Czecho-Slovakia in the first six months of the stabilization
programme in 1991. In Poland during the first six months of the stabilization
programme in 1990, IED increased by 70% in nominal terms and fell 36% in real
terms. On the other hand, in Russia in the first six months of 1992 the nominal
increase was almost 100 times, and the real increase was about eight and a half times,
while the ratio of IED to bank credit increased from almost zero to over two . In10
Romania the increase was similar, but not quite so rapid. In 1991 IED increased six
times in nominal terms and three times in real terms while the ratio of IED/bank
credit increased from 0.2 to 2 (Table 5). Second, it would be stretching the meaning
of words to suggest that Russia or Romania are market economies in anything like
the way in which Poland or Czecho-Slovakia are.
The intuition has to be that in the FSU and Romania the main reasons for the
IED explosion are macro, not micro, economic. Williamson [1992a] has provided a
useful taxonomy of the various kinds of macroeconomic shock to which PCEs have
been, or may have been, subject over the last three years (see Table 1). Some of these
categories of shock could have caused IED growth because their effects on
purchasers' cash flow was not anticipated by suppliers. The latter provided goods
before they realized that payment would not be forthcoming. Once this had
happened the reasons for "creditor passivity" described by Begg and Portes could
have come into play. This scenario could explain IED growth where purchasers were
affected by a fall in demand for their products for one of the following reasons: a fall
in foreign demand because of the collapse of CMEA trade; a shift in domestic
4demand (e.g. as a result of a fall in government's share of national income, which
seems to have taken place in Czecho-Slovakia); the elimination of forced substitution
with the disappearance of excess demand as a result of price liberalization; a fall in
domestic demand for purchasers' products as a result of foreign trade liberalization
(resulting in foreign competition); input dislocation making it impossible for
purchasers to complete their output and sell their product, in spite of provision of
inputs by some suppliers, because of the complementarity between inputs. Note that
most of these reasons were as much present in the Central European PCEs as in the
FSU and Romania.
Sachs and Lipton [1992] point to a number of technical causes of arrears
specific to the FSU. First, and most important, is the breakdown of bank payments
mechanisms leading to long delays in receiving payments . Enterprises which have11
not yet received payments cannot pay their own suppliers. The fact that in the FSU
non-cash rubles are not convertible into cash means that payment delays in the
banking system cannot be avoided by resorting to cash payment in exchange for a
discount on the price . It is natural that arrears have grown faster in the FSU where12
this is the case, than in Romania where SOEs are free to shift into cash to effect
payments  However, the slowdown in payments through the banks has itself been13
a result of accelerating inflation (banks wishing to obtain part of the inflation tax),
and therefore caused by macro-economic conditions. Second, according to Sachs and
Lipton, the cash shortage which existed until May of 1992 meant that final goods
purchases were squeezed more than intermediate goods purchases, and final goods
producers were unable to pay their suppliers. Intermediate goods producers, who
had more access to the non-cash money which was more easily available, then
5extended inter-enterprise credit (IEC) to final goods producers. While this factor may
have played some role, there is no evidence that IED is concentrated in retail trade
enterprises, or that the expansion of IED slowed after the elimination of the cash
shortage in mid-May 1992 . Finally, in the FSU VAT is paid on goods sold only when14
the money due for them is received. Thus some of the losses from payment arrears
are borne by the treasury rather than the supplier .15
3.  CREDIBILITY AND THE IED EXPLOSION
The most likely cause of massive growth in IED in the FSU and Romania thus
seems to be simply a lack of credibility of the stabilization component of a "big bang"
transition programme . A reduction in the rate of growth of bank credit in nominal16
terms is always announced as part of such a program, and a fall in the rate of growth
of real credit is usually part of its initial phase . State owned enterprises (SOEs)17
which do not believe in the durability of the reduction in the rate of growth of
nominal credit will behave entirely rationally if they extend credit to their customers.
They expect these customers to shortly obtain sufficient bank credit to be able to
repay the credit which suppliers have provided. However, in order to protect
themselves from the inflation which can be expected to accompany the loose
monetary policy which is implicit in such an expectation, they have to set prices
sufficiently above what they would otherwise be for the real value of the payment
they receive to compensate them for the goods they deliver on credit, adding even
more to inflation in the short term .18
This seems to be a good description of what has happened in the FSU in 1992
and Romania in 1991 (see Tables 2 and 5). Khan and Clifton, consider that it is the
6faster growth in prices than in the money supply which is the cause of the increase
in IED (to provide liquidity which compensates for the fall in real money balances
or real bank credit). For the present author the direction of causation goes the other
way: a lack of credibility in the stabilization program leads to a growth of the
IED/money ratio, to increased inflation, and finally to a fall in the real stock of
money. The lack of credibility of stabilization policy in Russia can also be seen in the
maintenance of production of military hardware by the Russian defence industry, in
spite of the very sharp cutback in budgetary spending under this heading. Because
defence industry enterprises are not being paid by the budget they cannot pay their
suppliers, yet they continue to be supplied [Sachs and Lipton, 1992].
In contrast, at the beginning of the stabilization program in Poland in 1990 the
real value of IED fell 40% from December 1989 to January 1990, after which it
remained at roughly the same level for the ensuing two and a half years (Table 3).
The ratio of IED to bank debt exhibited much the same pattern. In December 1989 it
was 1.54 and it rose over the two first months of the stabilization programme to 1.75.
It then fell almost continuously, reaching 0.95 in June 1990, 0.75 in January 1991, after
which it has fluctuated in the 0.75 to 1.0 range through to the summer of 1992. In
other words there was no IED explosion in Poland after stabilization in 1990, showing
that the stabilization was credible. 
Let us look in more detail at behaviour at the micro-economic level in such a
situation. If stabilization is not credible and rapid IED expansion is taking place, then
the prices charged by suppliers need to be higher than they would otherwise be as
a result of two effects: first, without the credit purchasers could not afford to pay as
high a price; second, the price incorporates an implicit interest charge for the
7expected delay in payment, which itself reflects expected inflation during the period
of non-payment. Effectively, for any given level of sales to a particular customer, a
supplier is making a choice between a low price with immediate payment and a high
price with delayed payment. If the authorities capitulate and abandon their
stabilization programme, the extension of the inter-enterprise credit (IEC) is justified
to the extent to which the price charged for the goods was sufficiently high to
compensate the supplier for the opportunity cost of the money he failed to obtain at
the time of delivery. 
In such a framework, what are likely to be the determinants of the expansion
of IED? These will include:
1) the expected length of time before the authorities reverse the credit
crunch    they have engineered;
2) the expected rate of inflation in this period;
3) the rate of interest on deposits;
4) the cost of financing inter-enterprise credit.
Given the expected values of these variables the SOE contemplating the extension of
inter-enterprise credit needs to choose an optimal price, quantity, IEC combination.
In the short term the system can be unstable: the larger the amount of IEC extended
the higher both price and quantity can be; if many enterprises decide on high levels
of IEC expansion this will lead to higher inflation, which may induce each creditor
to charge higher prices and extend even more credit. Moreover, higher inflation
means a reduction in the opportunity cost of IEC for any given rate of interest on
deposits and of the cost of financing IEC for any given nominal rate of interest on
loans. Thus there is the possibility of an inflationary bubble developing.
8The bubble can be burst by a number of developments: an increase in the
credibility of the stabilization programme; an extension in the expected period before
the credit crunch is reversed; the introduction of ex ante positive real interest rates
(on loans, deposits or both); or the unavailability of financing for IEC expansion. As
yet, none of the above conditions for bursting an IED driven inflationary bubble
seems to hold in Russia or the other countries of the FSU. This is a major difference
between the FSU on the one hand and Poland and Czecho-Slovakia on the other. In
the latter two countries, during the first six months of the stabilization programme,
real ex post rates of interest on loans were positive  and real ex post interest rates19
on deposits were massively positive in terms of foreign currency.
How do SOEs finance the IEC they extend to customers? To a large extent this
is done by not paying their suppliers, i.e. by the amount of IED they accumulate. This
makes the calculation regarding the optimal amount of IEC to extend even more
complex, in that the optimal amount of IED to contract becomes part of the
calculation, so that the prices charged by suppliers (which incorporate their implicit
interest charges) ought to be taken into account. Indeed, the calculation now becomes
so complex that one must doubt whether SOE managers in fact behave in such a
sophisticated way in deciding whether to extend IEC.
The true explanation may be cruder: when a Soviet-type Economy (STE)
becomes a PCE, state enterprises become free to extend inter-enterprise credit. If this
is followed shortly after by a credit squeeze as part of a stabilization programme,
SOEs may initially be willing to muddle through and avoid adjustment by both
taking on IED and extending IEC, without much concern about whether this is
financially optimal or not, as long as there is a general belief in the impermanence
9of the credit squeeze. The reasons for such apparently sub-optimal behaviour may not
be far to find. First, one must remember a key microeconomic fact: in the initial
stages of a big bang stabilization/liberalization package in a PCE there is unlikely to
be an effective bankruptcy system in operation . SOE managers are therefore unlikely20
to be very concerned about the effect on their income statements of extending or
taking on IEC.
Furthermore, in the initial stage of a stabilization programme in a PCE,
managers of SOEs are likely to have a particularly short time horizon because of the
high level of uncertainty, and may therefore attempt to avoid the conflicts with the
workforce over nominal wages which could arise from a need to economize on
money balances so as to be able to pay suppliers.  Money or bank credit are
indispensable to SOEs in the short term only for the payment of wages and the
purchase of foreign currency (in order to buy imports) . All other purchases can be21
financed by IEC, if only it is made available. Thus not only may enterprises be
unwilling to "waste" money on intermediate inputs when contracting IED is possible,
but also they may not insist on money payment as long as their money revenues22
suffice for those expenditures for which money is essential. There may, therefore, be
a widespread willingness to extend IEC, as long as the opportunity cost of doing so
is not very high due to low ex ante real interest rates on deposits .23
Every enterprise can thus, for a short time, effectively create liquidity on a base
of money as a reserve asset (which is needed to ensure wage payments etc.).  If24
domestically produced intermediate inputs constitute, for example, 60% of
expenditures then, as long as purchases of these inputs can be financed with IED,
SOEs could use all their money holdings to finance remaining expenditures, i.e wage
10
costs, payments for  imports of intermediate inputs and tax payments . In the25
aggregate the nominal value of transactions in the economy can increase rapidly
when IED begins to grow, even if the money supply is constant. Thus:
PT = M(1/a)V + D (1)
where a is the ratio of transactions in which the medium of exchange is money to
total transactions (which are financed using either money or by the extension of
additional IED), and D is the increment in IED. If M and V are constant then as long
as IED is increasing a < 1, so that 1/a > 1. We can have a number of patterns of
change in PT (with M and V constant). One such pattern would be the following:
1) when IED is forbidden by central planners, D = 0, a = 1 and PT is
constant;
2) when D is constant, a = some constant < 1, so that PT jumps to the
higher level which can be accommodated by M(1/a)V and D, until IED
reaches its maximum level;
3) once IED reaches its maximum level D = 0 and a = 1, so that PT jumps
down to its previous level, as at (1).
Maximum IED is determined by expected inflation, the nominal interest rate,
expected changes in the money supply and in the velocity of circulation . The above26
pattern would be consistent with the extreme case of a completely incredible
stabilization policy combined with a constant money supply. In phase (1) IED was
banned by central planners. During phase (2) SOEs are convinced that the authorities
will soon increase M. In phase (3) SOEs suddenly become convinced that the
authorities will not increase M after all.
Alternatively, if the stability of the economy is credible, then once IED is
11
legalized, it will rise to some level which is the aggregate of the decisions regarding
how much trade credit lenders and borrowers decide is optimal. While D is growing,
a is declining and the velocity of circulation of money with respect to all transactions
(V/a) - is increasing . Once D stabilizes a also stabilizes. Once IED stabilizes, D = 0,27
a = 1, so that PT falls back to its previous level of before the increase in IED. Thus,
even if the stability of the economy is credible, IED will only grow if an increase in
M or V are anticipated . Otherwise the growth in IED will merely cause a "bubble"28
in PT (and in inflation) .29
Finally, if there is no maximum for IED, because SOEs are prepared to extend
unlimited credit to their inter-enterprise customers, then D can remain constant
indefinitely (financing at the limit all inter-enterprise transactions), and PT can remain
stable. The need to pay for final goods and primary inputs in money, together with
a fixed M and V, is what constrains PT and thus inflation even in this extreme case .30
This is on the assumption that the prices of intermediate goods relative to final goods
and primary inputs remain unchanged. It is possible, however, that the unlimited
availability of IEC (e.g. because of an expectation of repeated multilateral clearing of
IED ) will lead to the relative prices of domestic intermediate inputs rising31
considerably in the short term. D would then rise without a falling. PT would
continue to grow, while PY remained constant. However, lower prices would come
to be charged for cash on delivery, requiring the calculation of PT in "cash prices"
(see below).
 The situation may be clarified further if we assume that some enterprises are
"downstream", some are "intermediate", while others are "upstream". The ratio of final
sales/intermediate sales is relatively high in downstream enterprises (e.g. retail
12
networks and exporters), as is the ratio of final sales/primary inputs. In a retail
network for example, 100% of sales may be "final", and thus involve the receipt of
cash money, 10% of expenditures may be primary and thus require the payment of
cash money, while 90% of expenditures may be intermediate, which can be paid for
either with non-cash money (on the assumption that, as in the ruble zone, the
difference between cash and non-cash money still exists), or by taking on IED. If all
domestic intermediate inputs are financed with IED, then such a downstream
enterprise will deposit its money revenues at its bank. In order to avoid this money
being paid out in response to a payment demand order it may deposit the money in
an hidden account, which its suppliers do not know about.
Then there are the "intermediate" enterprises. Let us assume that these have
no final sales but only inter-enterprise sales. They can supply their customers on
credit and receive domestic intermediate inputs from their suppliers on credit.
However, they do have some, relatively small, amount of primary inputs (wages and
imported intermediate inputs), which they have to pay for with money which they
borrow from the banking system. Finally, there are the "upstream" enterprises, which
sell most of their output to inter-enterprise customers, but most of whose inputs are
primary (labour, imports). They too have to borrow money from the banks. 
The banking system thus acts as the conduit for money from "money rich"
downstream enterprises to "money poor" intermediate and upstream enterprises.
Since the "money poor" enterprises cannot service their debts, let alone repay them,
once such a situation arises the banking system is effectively bankrupt.
If, upon liberalization, intermediate and upstream enterprises begin to finance
all purchases by their inter-enterprise customers by extending IEC, then the effects
13
of IED on PT can follow the following three phases:
1) when IED is forbidden, D = 0 and PT is constant;
2) when IED is permitted, D > 0 and PT jumps to the higher level at which all
M is used exclusively for transactions involving final sales or primary inputs, while
all intermediate transactions are financed by IEC;
3) if, in this situation, there is no limit on the growth of IED, then the relative
prices of domestic intermediate products can continue to rise, causing continued
growth of PT, increasing paper profits among upstream (and possibly intermediate)
enterprises, and declining paper profits or even paper losses among downstream
enterprises.
The point is that in this configuration it is far from clear what mechanism
would, in the short term, prevent IED from increasing indefinitely. Indeed, D could
grow over time so that IED grew at a constant (or even at an accelerating) rate. If M
was not increased, final goods producers' unit costs would rise while their revenues
remained constant. The result could be falling sales of final output.
Lipton and Sachs [1992] have suggested that a similar process, in which the
supply of non-cash money expands more rapidly than the supply of cash, may be one
of the causes of the current Russian depression. Just as IEC is not convertible on
demand into money so, in the ruble zone, non-cash money is not convertible into
cash (except for certain categories of payments, such as wages, which are usually
those required to obtain primary inputs). Furthermore, non-cash money is received
mainly by intermediate and upstream enterprises, as a result of sales to other
enterprises or as bank credit. Cash money is received mainly by retailers, and is spent
mainly by very upstream enterprises which have high labour costs. The difference
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between non-cash money and IED is that non-cash money is created by the banking
system, whereas IED is created by the enterprises. 
In both cases, however, the more rapid expansion of the inferior and
inconvertible means of payment (IED as against money, non-cash money as against
cash), if it continues unchecked, must ultimately lead to its depreciation. Prices will
be quoted both for cash or money payment and (higher ones) for non-cash or delayed
payment (involving the extension of IEC by the supplier). Once it has been
recognised by all that there are in fact several means of payment in use within the
country and that output price formation, profit calculation and taxation must take this
fact into account, the real effects of IED or non-cash money growing faster than
money or cash will disappear. The relative prices of intermediate goods will continue
to rise in non-cash rubles or when sold on credit, but will remain constant in cash or
money terms. As regards the accumulation of IED, the result would be a real
devaluation of the stock of debt to the level which suppliers wish to hold. Once this
had happened the real value of IED could not grow unless suppliers wished to hold
more of it, real D = 0, and PT denominated in "money prices" (as opposed to those
charged when IEC was extended) would be constant: this would be the long-term
result in phase (3) above. One can thus see that the problems associated with
excessive IED growth (and excessive non-cash money growth) are those of a
transitional period, in which it has not been openly admitted that an SOE's debt may
not be worth its face value, or that non-cash rubles are not worth cash rubles.
There is, of course, an important difference between IED and non-cash money.
Since there is an implicit government guarantee of all bank deposits, actors need
know only one price: the exchange rate of cash into non-cash rubles. In the case of
15
IED suppliers need to assess the likely payment delay specific to each customer.   
4.  CONSEQUENCES
As we have seen, the disappearance of administrative constraints on IED may
lead to a temporary expansion of liquidity (money plus increases in IED) in the
economy with little increase in the money supply. 
A number of macroeconomic consequences follow. First,  prices can rise more
than expected if the expansion of IED was not foreseen [Khan and Clifton]. Second,
since the "liquidity" provided by IED is of a very specific sort (i.e. unlike bank debt
it is not usually accepted as a means of payment by third parties), the steady state
nominal value of transactions in the economy remains unchanged . As a result,32
although the increase in liquidity allows prices to increase more than they would
have done, once liquidity is again stable then either prices or real transactions, or
both, have to fall, so as to return nominal transactions to their previous level. These
processes might therefore help to explain both price "overshooting" and the large
output falls during stabilization/liberalization programmes in PCEs .33
Policy makers implementing a stabilization programme in a PCE thus have to
choose between, on the one hand, an initial reduction followed by an increase in real
money balances, together with an increase in the size of the money multiplier as the
ratio of high powered money to deposits in the structure of bank balance sheets
declines [Rostowski 1992] during a successful disinflation, and on the other hand the
expansion of inter-enterprise liquidity discussed here, when the stabilization is not
credible [see Calvo 1992 for a useful framework within which one can consider these
options].
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A second round consequence of such an unsustainable increase in nominal
transactions is that, when SOEs come to understand the nature of the process, they
put pressure on the monetary authorities to increase the money supply, the velocity
of circulation or the multilateral "clearing" of IED, so as to validate the price increases
they have generated (see Section 5).
Apart from the macroeconomic drawbacks resulting from an IED explosion,
there is also a complex of microeconomic problems, which are described by Begg and
Portes. The first is that uncertainty regarding the liquidation value of individual
enterprises is increased. Second, systemic risk arises because of the creation of an
interlocking network of enterprise commitments. Third, liquidity is redistributed from
sound to potentially unsound enterprises, which impedes exit and restructuring of
the unsound. 
5.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE IED PROBLEM
The simplest solution to the IED problem is to reverse the conditions which
have given rise to it. This solution is usually favoured by those who are opposed to
macroeconomic stabilization on the grounds that the cost, in terms of reductions in
output and employment, is unacceptable.  This implies making available as much
bank credit - via an expansion of central bank credit or a reduction in reserve ratios -
as is needed to ensure that the current level of PT can be financed by the new money
stock M . In economies which require macroeconomic stabilization this can be the34
route to uncontrolled hyperinflation: the increase in bank credit would confirm the
expectations of loose monetary policy which make the stabilization incredible.
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Additional bank credit would then be needed not only to finance old IED, but also
the new inter-enterprise credit which SOEs would extend more willingly once they
knew that bank credit was once again easily available. A race between the growth
rates of bank credit, inter-enterprise credit and prices would develop .35
Alternatively, there can be a "multilateral clearing" of IED, without any
additional money creation. As we shall see in Section 5.2, such an approach is likely
to be less expansionary than money creation. Nevertheless, it does present serious
difficulties: there is nothing wrong with cancelling out mutual obligations between
pairs of enterprises; however, there is a fundamental difference between such "bi-
lateral" netting out and the "multi-lateral" netting out (Section 5.1).
An approach which is intermediate between the two described above, consists
in first "cancelling out" as much IED as possible, and then providing central bank
credit to finance remaining net IED. Such a solution was implemented in Romania
in December 1991 and in Russia in July 1992. Providing bank credit to finance the
remaining net IED means that the authorities effectively validate the previous credit
policies of SOEs. It means that SOEs are allowed to have effectively determined the
level of bank credit growth in the period up to the emission of the new bank credit,
i.e. to have determined monetary policy. The effects of such a mechanism then
depend crucially on the extent to which the clearing is credible as a "one off" event.
We explain in Section 5.4 why we consider this to be unlikely.
5.1  The Russian schemes
The Russian government's proposed solution to the IED problem in the
summer of 1992 was of the "multilateral clearing without bank credit creation"
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variety. The first step was to cancel out the debts among enterprises, and then use
the assets of net debtors to pay net creditors. Net debtors were thus to be fully or
partly liquidated. As the bankruptcy system is not operational, and will not be
operational for some time, a special centralized debt management agency was to have
been set up to administer the realisation of net debtors' assets [see Sachs and Lipton,
1992, for a description of how such a system might work] . While such an approach36
was less dangerous than that advocated by the Central Bank of Russia and in effect
finally adopted (see below), there are still a number of serious problems involved.
First, the very act of multilaterally "netting out" IED is not a neutral, technical
undertaking which merely ensures that mutual liabilities can be settled more quickly
and conveniently - even though it is sometimes presented as such. The multilateral
clearing of IED implies that all the IED "cleared" is given an equal value in the
clearing process, with the result that the authorities change the true underlying (and
as yet possibly unrevealed) values of the IEC extended by different enterprises. This
value depends on the true, also possibly as yet unrevealed, creditworthiness of the
borrowers. If the "multilateral clearing" did not take place, the IEC extended to
purchasers who are expected to pay relatively quickly would be worth more than
that extended to those who are expected to pay later - or possibly never. By setting
all IED cleared equal to its nominal value, the authorities eradicate these differences
in the value of IEC extended and then cleared.
It is true that only cleared IED benefits from this "equalling up" in this
approach, with the result that the proposal of the Russian government was less
inflationary than the CBR's in which, after "multilateral clearing", bank credit is
injected to pay off all remaining net IED. How much less inflationary in the short run
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"multilateral clearing without bank credit creation" is than its "with bank credit
creation" cousin, depends on how much multilateral clearing of IED can be effected:
the more IED is successfully cleared the smaller the difference between the two
approaches in the short run (in the long run IED growth depends on increases in M
or V - see Section 3). The amount that can be cleared may vary considerably,
depending on the proportion of IED owed by net debtors. Thus, in 1991 the
Comercny Banka of Czecho-Slovakia cleared IED and as a result reduced it by 20%
[Begg 1991], whereas the Romanian multilateral clearing operation of end January
1992 resulted in the clearing of 75% of all IED .37
It is worth also considering the political economy of the "multilateral clearing
without bank credit creation" approach: the more IED has been cleared by
"multilateral clearing" the greater the likelihood that the small additional amount of
bank credit required to avoid unpleasant consequences for net debtors (and net
creditors!) will somehow be created .38
The similarity between the "multilateral clearing" of IED and the creation of
money so that IED can be serviced is highlighted by the technique which was used
for  "multilateral clearing" in Russia in 1992: special accounts were created for each
enterprise on which its inter-enterprise assets and liabilities were registered. Those
enterprises with positive balances could then use their "special accounts" to pay off
their IED. SOEs which received such payments could in turn use them to pay off
their own IED . The close similarity of this procedure to money creation is evident.39
If the "special accounts" had not been created, money would have had to be used to
service the IED. In this way  ordinary money was freed to be used for other
purposes.
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In the event, in Russia net creditors' positive balances on the special accounts
were subsequently turned into money by making them useable for tax payments and
for the servicing of bank debt, thus turning the earmarked money on the special
accounts into ordinary money . This has effectively meant the triumph of the Central40
Bank of Russia approach to IED clearing. The CBR wished to combine multilateral
IED clearing with injections of central bank credit. In Romania also, the multilateral
IED clearing exercise of December 1991 has involved an increase in the money
supply.
5.2  The Inflationary effect of different solutions 
It is useful to compare the expansionary/inflationary effects of the three
mechanisms:
(1) multilateral clearing without bank credit (i.e. money) creation;
(2) increasing M sufficiently to allow the money stock to service the new,
higher, level of nominal transactions - PT in equation (1) - resulting
from the extension of IED, without engaging in any multilateral
clearing ; 41
(3) multilateral clearing with bank credit creation.
If all IED could be multilaterally cleared, the approach excluding bank credit creation
would then be the equivalent of temporarily increasing the velocity of circulation of
money (V) to the extent required to allow all IED to be paid off while maintaining
the quantity of money (M) constant. In terms of equation (1) therefore, PT can be
sustained at its new, higher, level P'T'(determined by the optimal IED/M ratio),
because domestic intermediate inputs can be purchased through the accumulation of
new IED, i.e. D>0 once again. As a result the constant money stock M can continue
to be used to finance exclusively transactions in final goods and primary inputs, i.e.
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a<1. Under these circumstances comprehensive multilateral clearing is equivalent in
the very short term to an increase in M which would have the same effect on PT .42
However, there is an important difference between multilateral clearing and
increasing the money supply when we take into account the effects of expectations
on post-clearing events. We have noted that for transactions to be sustained at the
higher level P'T' after a multilateral clearing of IED, IED must be allowed to grow
after the clearing exercise. Thus, expectations of repeated multilateral clearings, far
from fuelling accelerating inflation, are actually necessary if the aim of preventing
nominal transactions from falling is to be achieved. However, the situation is quite
different when there has been an increase in M. If this increase was sufficient to
sustain transactions at P'T' in the presence of a belief among SOEs that M will not be
increased further (and that there would be no multilateral clearing of IED), then if
SOEs in fact expect further increases in M (or multilateral clearing), the result will be
not just the maintenance of transactions at P'T', but instead an increase in transactions
to a new, even higher level P"T".  Thus in the presence of a lack of credibility,
increasing M will be more inflationary than multilateral clearing.
The mechanism involving the creation of bank credit to eliminate net IED,
which would only need to be applied if it were impossible to multilaterally clear all
IED, would involve both a temporary increase in V and a permanent increase in M.
Thus, the expansionary effect of this approach will be greater than that of multilateral
clearing of all IED without bank credit creation. However, the inflationary effect of
this mechanism may actually be greater than that of increasing M and not having a
multilateral clearing of IED. This is, first, because the increase in M required to make
the elimination of all net IED possible may be greater than the increase in M required
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to allow the stock of money to service the new level of nominal transactions P'T'.
What one might call the "money supply base" for the creation of IED would be
increasedly (see equation (1)), so that IED could reach a higher maximum level than
before (as determined by the aggregate of the optimum IED/M ratios for individual
SOEs). Second, even if this is not the case, part of the stock of IED will have been
cleared, allowing part of P'T' to be financed by increases in IED, so that a smaller
increase in M together with the multilateral clearing of part of the old IED could have
a stronger inflationary effect than a larger increase in M unaccompanied by any
clearing of IED. Multilateral clearing without money creation is thus the least
inflationary of the three mechanisms discussed, with the relative position of the
remaining two being ambiguous.
The situation looks rather different if we assume that "downstream" enterprises
are money rich while "intermediate" and "upstream" enterprises are money poor, and
that the banking system acts as the conduit from the former to the latter, as we did
in Section 3. If IED becomes grossly excessive, such a situation results in the banking
system becoming effectively bankrupt, because the "money poor" enterprises can
never be expected to be able to service, let alone repay, the credits they have obtained
from the banking system. In this case, multilateral clearing without money creation
will not suit, as the IED of net debtors is large. Money creation then not only
provides the finance for commercial banks to be able to continue crediting
intermediate and upstream enterprises, but by causing inflation, it reduces the real
value of their past debt. As such, the policy can be thought of as being directed at
saving the banks as much as the "money poor" SOEs. In this case, reducing the
nominal value of IED by securitizing it (as described in Section 7) might need to be
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accompanied by a once and for all increase in bank liquidity and a once and for all
recapitalization of the banks.
5.3  Perverse incentives resulting from multilateral clearing
These occur if SOEs expect that a "multilateral clearing" of IED is due to take
place, even if the clearing is to involve no bank credit injection whatsoever. In such
a case, SOEs which are net debtors can improve their position by extending more IEC
(which will then be set against what they owe). As long as they can do this there is
no reason for them to attempt to achieve balance by reducing the IED they owe.
Equally, net creditors will try to achieve balance so as to avoid being left holding the
possibly valueless assets of the net debtors. However, they need not try to do this by
reducing the IEC they have extended, but may rather do so by taking on additional
IED - particularly since reducing IEC one has already extended may not be easy.
Ceasing delivery to a debtor will not reduce the level of IEC an SOE has extended
if the debtor ceases servicing his debt. As we have just noted, there will be net
debtors happy to accommodate net creditors in this desire.
Once all SOEs had achieved rough balance of their IE assets and liabilities,
then even if every SOE insisted on maintaining this balance, no technical limit would
be set on IED growth if SOEs knew that a multilateral clearing exercise (even without
money creation) was due to take place . This is similar to the situation under free43
banking: the "law of reflux" and a bank clearing system are not of themselves
sufficient to prevent excessive note issue by the banking system [Smith 1936] .44
Multilateral clearing will thus bias the economy towards the expansion of IED. The
root cause of this bias has already been discussed: it stems from artificially setting the
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value of one unit of each SOE's IED equal to that of every other SOE in the clearing
process.
Although the nominal value of final goods and primary inputs should not be
affected if M remains constant, nevertheless, the effects on the economy will be
deleterious, as SOEs will compete for domestic intermediate inputs, driving up the
prices of these relative to other goods (while their volume remains constant). The
effects on the redistribution of profits among enterprises have already been discussed
in Section 3. Alternatively, the real value of final goods could fall together with an
increase in their price, due to the increase in the prices of intermediate goods. SOEs,
not being profit maximizers might operate on a cost plus basis, at least in the short
and medium terms . The expectation of multilateral clearing, and the IED growth it45
leads to could, in such a case, cause accelerating stagflation . This would happen46
both in the short term, i.e. when SOEs know that a clearing of IED is to take place
soon, and in the long term, if they come to believe that such clearings will be a
permanent feature of the economic system. In such a situation, in which IED has
severely distorted relative prices, multilateral clearing is no solution whatever to the
difficulties the economy is encountering as a result of excessive IED.
If a multilateral clearing with money creation is expected, then SOEs do not
even need to ensure that their expanding IED is balanced by their IEC, so that the
strength of the bias towards the expansion of IED is strongly augmented. Moreover,
money creation will result in an increase in the money supply base for subsequent
IED expansion.   
All the above objections have far less force if multilateral clearing is voluntary
and there is no money creation. In that case there is no imposition of equal value on
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assets which may intrinsically have very different values. Nevertheless, even here, the
multilateral clearing of IED speeds up the velocity of circulation of money, something
which authorities in a country with near hyperinflation may wish to avoid. They
would certainly need to try to allow for the resulting increases in velocity when
determining monetary policy.
5.4  The Romanian Scheme 
We saw in Section 5.2 that it is right to attach some importance to the
relatively small size of the increase in broad money which was part of the
multilateral IED clearing in Romania . However, it is far more doubtful whether the47
Romanian authorities have been on the right track when, in order to convince SOEs
that the clearing exercise was "one off" and thus to avoid the moral hazard problem,
they attempted to sharply restrict IED after the multilateral clearing exercise of end
1991 by making failure to pay invoices within 30 days sufficient grounds for
declaring a debtor insolvent . Quite apart from ones doubts regarding the48
effectiveness of the Romanian measures, which depend on the voluntary actions of
suppliers (creditors), it is dubious whether they are in fact desirable on either macro-
or micro-economic grounds.
If there is a comprehensive multilateral clearing of IED accompanied by a
minimal increase in the money supply, then if we were initially in a situation in
which the existing money stock was insufficient to effect the current level of nominal
transactions (including intermediate transactions), then we remain in that situation
after the multilateral clearing. Therefore, in spite of the clearing, either a combination
of prices and output must fall or a combination of money supply and IED must
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increase. Not very surprisingly, therefore, in spite of the restrictions, IED in Romania
increased from zero to 800 billion lei in the first six months of 1992, compared with
an increase from 100 billion lei to 600 billion lei in the first half of 1991 [Table 5] .49
From the micro-economic perspective, it seems very doubtful whether one
month's trade credit is enough for a market economy: as we saw in Section 2 average
trade credit in the West ranges from one and a half months in Germany and
Scandinavia to three and one third months in France. 
 We have already seen that once multilateral IED clearing with central bank
credit injection begins to be seriously discussed, SOEs will know that in the run-up
to the clearing they can effectively force the creation of bank and central bank credit
by extending IEC . This is exactly what happened in Romania in 1991. Khan and50
Clifton therefore suggest that the preparation of a multilateral clearing of IED should
not be a long drawn out process. However, it is difficult to imagine the first (and
supposedly last) such exercise in any country taking less than the few months which
were required in Romania. Furthermore, once a multilateral clearing of IED had taken
place, it is not in fact likely to be credible that it will not be repeated. SOEs are
therefore likely to believe that they can effectively force the creation of bank and
central bank credit by extending IEC. Naturally, they could in fact do so only if
central bank policy proved to be accommodating. However, the costs of convincing
SOEs of central banks' determination not to accommodate IEC extension could be
very large. 
5.5 Other proposed solutions
 A number of authors [e.g. Calvo and Frenkel 1991, Williamson 1992b] have
suggested that the IED problem could be solved by forgiving or consolidating the
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debts. Forgiveness differs from creating sufficient bank credit to allow all IED to be
paid off to the extent that net creditors loose in proportion to their net asset position.
However, the idea that such an outcome would be politically acceptable is at the least
doubtful. As Calvo and Frenkel admit, it is more likely that after such debt
forgiveness either the treasury would have to reimburse net creditors, or the central
bank would have to create credit to provide liquidity to cover net creditors' losses.
In both cases there would be little difference between debt forgiveness and increasing
the money supply . As for consolidation (i.e. rescheduling), under conditions of high51
inflation, it differs little from debt forgiveness unless the real value of IED is
maintained through indexation .52
6. MARKET BASED SOLUTIONS
The first of these is to simply do nothing about IED, as was done in Poland
in 1990-2, and as Begg and Portes recommend. By the middle of 1990 IED had fallen
to 95% of total bank credit, compared to 154% before the beginning of the
stabilization program in December 1989, and through to the summer of 1992 it never
exceeded 100% [Table 3]. On the other hand real bank credit exceeded its December
1989 level by August 1990 and then stayed at about that level for the next two years.
If nothing is done, Polish experience shows that a number of mechanisms may
begin to operate to limit IED expansion (and even to cause contraction). The most
important, of course, is that suppliers simply cease supplying those who are
particularly slow in paying, unless they pay cash. Second, resumption of supplies can
be accompanied by a cash settlement of outstanding IED at some (often considerable)
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discount. Third, a secondary IED market develops in which financial intermediaries
begin to trade IED at a discount. In Poland this market began to operate in early 1990
(i.e. soon after the beginning of the stabilization program) when one of the state
commercial banks began to purchase the IED of its clients from their suppliers. As
a bank, it had the right to deduct money owed to it from its clients' bank accounts
and was therefore in a much better position to enforce payment than were the
suppliers themselves. However, as could be expected, clients responded to this by
moving their accounts elsewhere, and the bank concerned had to give up its activity
on the IED market. By 1991 a number of private firms were acting on this market as
brokers, bringing together creditors and debtors of an enterprise which was
particularly bad at servicing its IED. The debtor of such an enterprise can buy his
creditor's inter-enterprise liabilities from his creditor's creditors at a discount, and set
them against his own liabilities. The bad debtor's creditors gain liquidity, while its
debtors save money, the brokers charge a commission.
Setting real interest rates at realistic levels is an important part of "doing
nothing" about IED. As described in Section 3 this increases both the opportunity cost
and the cost of financing of IEC. A sharp increase in interest rates can thus be an
important instrument in bursting a "IED-price-IED" bubble. However, making it
mandatory for creditors to charge penal rates on IEC is not likely to be helpful. In the
first place, where IEC is extended voluntarily the authorities' intention can easily be
avoided by post-dating invoices. Second, where debtors cannot pay, pushing them
even faster into a debt trap is not useful. Special high rates on IED are an attempt to
affect directly the financial relationship between supplier and purchaser . Since this53
relationship may already be unhealthy, in the sense that it exhibits a large element
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of creditor passivity, it may not respond much to such changes in the price of credit.
It is therefore better to affect the supplier's (lender's) financial environment through
economy wide interest rates.
However, some developments which one might have expected to occur on the
basis of western experience, may in fact be unlikely. In Poland in early 1990, when
IED was thought to be a serious problem, much hope was placed on its voluntary
securitization. It was hoped that suppliers would insist on immediate payment with
bills of exchange (weekly). Such bills have the advantage that, if they are not
honoured by their term date then the failure to do so becomes a sufficient reason for
a court to declare the bankruptcy of the issuer . Not surprisingly, purchasers were54
unwilling to voluntarily transform the undated liabilities which IED constitutes into
strictly regulated commercial bills, so that the use of bills has not increased
significantly.
Thus if the stock of IED is of approximately the magnitude observed in
established market economies and if its rate of growth is not excessive - as has been
the case in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia - then doing little about IED is probably
best . 55
7.  FORCED SECURITIZATION
However, doing little may not be an adequate response if, due to the lack of
credibility of the stabilization policy, IED has expanded to such an extent that the
existing level of nominal transactions (including IED servicing) is too large to be
effected by the existing stock of money, requiring a sharp fall in prices or output or
both. In other words: what should be done if the stabilization has not been credible,
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the stock of IED is excessive relative to the money supply, but the authorities are
determined to stabilize, and we wish to minimize the cost of their doing so?
Moreover, as Khan and Clifton point out, falling output, which is the result of the
lack of credibility of the stabilization, may itself increase the lack of credibility.
We thus come to the final possibility - a market based reduction in the nominal
value of IED. As we have seen, a reduction in nominal IED should not take the form
of a multilateral clearing of IED imposed from above. This is above all because it is
very unlikely that the "one off" nature of a multilateral clearing of IED will be
credible. There will be a bias in the economy towards the expansion of IED, as a
result of the lack of credibility and the setting of the value of all IED equal to par,
both in the run-up to the first clearing exercise and subsequently. This bias will be
stronger if multilateral clearing of IED is combined with money creation. As a result,
the situation after clearing is likely to revert rapidly to what it was before, with a
level of nominal transactions which is unsustainable with the given money supply
without a further multilateral clearing of IED. If IED expansion has led to a serious
distortion of relative prices in the economy, then multilateral clearing provides no
solution and merely perpetuates this situation. Furthermore, measures which have
been suggested to strengthen the credibility of clearing as a "one-off" event are likely
to involve considerable microeconomic costs - if they are at all effective. 
The securitization of IED, by which it would be continuously "marked to
market" would not have the same undesirable effects. There would be no credibility
problems, because no concession would have been made (in the sense of bailing out
SOEs which had imprudently extended IEC or taken on IED). Once the market
mechanism for revaluing IED had been established, it would function continuously.
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Thus there would be no problem of whether revaluation was to be repeated or not.
Finally, the value of the liabilities of borrowers of varying quality would not then be
made uniform and effectively set equal to their nominal value . 56
What would be the effects of this approach on the prices and output of goods
and services? To make the situation more realistic, let us assume that the economy
we are discussing conforms to our second model from Section 3, in which enterprises
are either "downstream", "intermediate" or "upstream". Unlike our first "average
enterprise" model, downstream final goods producers have high levels of IED and
significant amounts of money in their bank deposits. Intermediate enterprises have
large amounts of IED, but have also granted large amounts of IEC, while upstream
primary input purchasing enterprises have granted large amounts of IEC, but have
large borrowing from the banking system. As we noted in Section 5.2, revaluing IED
on the market might then cause problems for the liquidity of the banking system, as
final goods producers would finance more of their purchases from "intermediate"
enterprises by buying the IED of the latter from SOEs further upstream for money.
This money would not then be deposited as before in banks. A once and for all
increase in bank liquidity might therefore be needed. There might also be a need for
a once and for all recapitalization of the banks to compensate them for the losses they
might suffer if purchasers of primary inputs found that they had to sell their IEC at
such low prices that they were unable to service their bank debt.
However, revaluing IED on the market should make it easier for all three
kinds of enterprise to go the route of price rather than output reduction in their
adjustment to the shortage of liquidity in the economy at the given level of nominal
transactions. Let us take the case of intermediate goods producers first (i.e. both
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"intermediate" and "upstream" enterprises according to the classification we adopted
in Section 3). A supplier of such goods who is owed a large amount of IEC by his
customers has relatively little interest in reducing his sales price. If his inter-enterprise
assets are equivalent to several months' worth of sales then, even if the demand curve
for his product is elastic, any reduction in his sales prices will result increased
revenue only once the IEC outstanding at the time he makes the decision has been
paid off - and this is several months away. However, it is not only a matter of there
being an long delay between price reduction and increased liquidity for the supplier.
There is the more fundamental problem of the credibility of the purchaser, who has
not been paying promptly and who now states that he is willing to accept larger
deliveries if the price of the goods he purchases is reduced (it needs to be
remembered that this in an institutional environment in which the bankruptcy system
is not operational). In fact, for the liquidity of the supplier to improve once the goods
delivered now at a lower price are paid for at a future date, then the IEC extended
by the supplier to the purchaser must actually increase in the period until these lower
priced goods are due to be paid for! Many suppliers may be unwilling to take this
risk .57
  This problem can, of course, be solved if the supplier concerned offers a lower
price for his products subject to immediate money payment on delivery for the newly
lower priced items. In that case, by voluntary agreement between the parties a
temporary moratorium is effectively placed on the customer's IED. This is quite
similar to marking the IED concerned to market, something which becomes explicit
if these moves are accompanied by an agreement on how the outstanding IED is to
be serviced or paid off at a discount. The advantage of creating a market for all IED,
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however, is that a price is generated for each SOE's IED in that market, allowing
creditors to obtain money in exchange for their inter-enterprise assets if they so wish.
Also time consuming bilateral debt rescheduling or reduction negotiations can be
avoided. Once this has happened, suppliers are freer to decide whether to offer lower
prices, and whether to demand payment on delivery or to extend new IEC to their
customers. They thus operate in a more transparent environment than previously.
The situation with regard to final output is somewhat different. With a given
money stock and a given velocity of circulation suppliers as a whole cannot increase
their cash flow by reducing prices. But unless suppliers can enter a cartel, many
individual suppliers will be able to increase revenue by reducing price, or will be
able to maintain revenue in the face of price reductions by others only by reducing
prices themselves.
As suppliers of final goods are generally paid immediately in cash, the
problem of customer creditworthiness does not arise. However, it may be hard to
reduce output prices in order to improve one's liquidity if one's suppliers are
unwilling to reduce their prices. Producers of final goods may be unwilling to sell
products at significantly below cost, even if their cash flow improves temporarily as
a result and even when there is no effective bankruptcy system. If they do so they
may make it more likely that they will not be able to service the IED they owe their
suppliers in the long run, unless these latter themselves reduce their prices. Yet, as
we have seen, there may be good reasons for intermediate goods producers not to
reduce prices, unless this is accompanied by some credible settlement of the IEC they
are owed. Thus, marking their IED to market may be essential for final producers
also to be able to reduce their output prices . What is more, given the existence of58
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a secondary IED market, intermediate input suppliers might be more willing to
reduce their own prices as described previously, which would mean that more final
goods producers could individually improve cash flow without worsening their
profitability. 
To summarise: the creation of a secondary IED market would not be sufficient
to result in the (constant) money supply becoming fully adequate to finance the
higher level of nominal transactions which has resulted from an excessive expansion
of IED. Prices or quantities, or some combination of both, would still have to fall.
However, prices could fall more and output could fall less than in the absence of a
secondary IED market . Furthermore, the stock of money needed for the servicing59
of IED might be smaller, as much of the debt settlement which took place would
happen on the basis of the setting off against each other of the assets and liabilities
of given SOEs . 60
Last but not least, an excessive stock of IED has effects which are similar to
those of a debt deflation, and this applies both to intermediate and final goods
producers [Fisher 1936]. In this situation falling product prices, which are essential
if output is not to fall and the money supply is not to be increased, result in increases
in the real value of the inter-enterprise component of SOEs' liabilities. Given a
constant money supply, reductions in prices can have no effect in the aggregate on
SOEs' cash flow nor on the ratio of that cash flow to their IED. Nevertheless, it does
increase the real value of that debt, possibly to a degree which might be considered
unrepayable, even in the absence of interest charges on IED. If this were the case,
suppliers would be unwilling to continue supplying such customers . In such a61
situation output would fall even if prices were fully flexible downwards. Of course,
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as with a standard western debt deflation, one can either accept the output effects for
the sake of the anti-inflationary results, or one can try to reduce the real value of the
debt through an inflationary policy (or prevent it from increasing through an anti-
deflationary policy). The difference is that in a PCE in transition loose financial policy
may cause expectations to become not merely inflationary but hyperinflationary. If
there were a secondary market on which the value of IED could be reduced in
nominal terms, the danger that persistence with stringent monetary policy would lead
to a debt deflation would be reduced . 62
8.  INTER-ENTERPRISE DEBT AUCTIONS
However, for all this to happen IED must be tradeable, i.e. securitized. As we
have seen, the Polish experience shows that SOEs are unlikely to voluntarily
securitize their debt quickly: the securitization therefore has to be forced if it is to be
rapid. What is more, we noted that it is the absence of an efficient bankruptcy system
which causes the IED problem to arise in the first place: the exact nature of the
instruments into which IED would be transformed would therefore have to take this
key institutional fact into account.
 Fortunately, a good instrument is to hand in those countries which have the
good luck to have maintained the "payment demand" system which existed under
central planning. Under this system, demand for payment is not sent directly to the
purchaser in the form of an invoice, but instead is sent by the seller's bank to the
purchaser's bank in the form of a "payment demand". Once the payment demand
reaches the purchaser's bank it is automatically paid out of the purchaser's account.
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If there is no money to fulfil the payment demand it is filed in the so-called "second
file" (kartoteka dva) of the account in the order in which it arrives .63
The existence of this payment demand system allows the elimination of an
excessive stock of IED through the simple expedient of IED auctions. Since all
payment demands in the "kartoteka dva" are dated, it is simple enough to decide to
auction off each month all the demands which are, let us say, more than three
months overdue . All commercial banks, on  instructions from the Central Bank,64
would be obliged to organize such auctions. This would be necessary to avoid the
defection of customers to banks which were not forcibly securitizing IED. Settlements
would have to be by banker's cheque or cash. Initially one would expect three kinds
of bidders to appear on the market: the creditors (who would be setting a reserve
price), the debtors (who would be offering to settle their debt at a discount), and
debtors' debtors, who by buying their creditors' liabilities at a discount could reduce
their own liabilities to their creditors by setting off the newly acquired assets against
their own liabilities. With time, however, one could expect the emergence professional
arbitragers, who would buy the liabilities of a particular SOE on the basis that its
debtors' debtors at several removes would be willing to purchase this security as a
cheap way of settling their own liabilities.
How efficient will such a market be? For efficiency each of the players should
have equal access to information about the financial position of the SOE in whose
debt he wishes to trade. Since this depends in turn on the financial position of the
debtors of the SOE concerned, and their position depends on that of their own
debtors, and so on, one could argue that for the market to be efficient all players have
to have equal access to information about the financial position of all SOEs. Not only
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is this clearly impossible, it is also unnecessary. The players likely to be initially
involved in trading an SOE's debt are, as already mentioned, the firm itself, its
creditors and its debtors. A considerable amount of information about the firm and
its environment will be available to all these players acting together (and against each
other). The price for the IED of the SOE concerned will be the result of the bids of
the players involved, and will be a reflection of the information held by them . In65
setting a price for IED the bidders will be making the information they hold available
to others, including players involved in pricing another SOE's IED. Although the
market for an SOE's IED cannot be efficient, it is the attempt by those with privileged
information to benefit by it from participating in the market which generates and
spreads information regarding the SOE concerned. 
The fact that no effective bankruptcy system exists, and that it is very unlikely
that such system can be created in the time frame required , means that it would be66
pointless to set a term by which the newly securitized IED had to be repaid, since
there are no sanctions which can be effectively applied in the case of non-compliance.
Unpaid payment demands are already overdue liabilities, and it seems unnecessary
to pretend otherwise by setting a new, later, time limit. Equally, since it is the
purpose of such securitization to make it possible for equal nominal values of IED
debt be set off against each other (whatever the discount they may have been bought
at), one should no longer require debtors to meet the payment demands in
chronological order . There remains the fact that the secondary market value of IED67
might increase as the prospect of effective bankruptcy procedures approaches. This
need not be a problem, as it will induce debtors to settle for cash the more quickly.
Also, the main stabilization problems, which are the primary source of excessive IED,
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should have been settled by the time an effective bankruptcy system is in place.
As a final twist, it is possible to widen participation in the securitized IED
market considerably by making debt to equity conversion possible, either on the basis
of negotiation between creditors and debtors or, preferably, through rules relating
nominal IED to the book value of SOEs. In this way the secondary IED market, in
which private persons would be allowed to participate on equal terms, could become
a powerful instrument in the privatization process .68
What can be done in countries in which the "payment demand" system has
already been abolished? One possibility is to oblige suppliers to obtain a confirmation
of delivery which would show the value of the goods delivered. In the absence of
such a confirmation suppliers would be denied recourse to the courts to enforce
payment. Effectively, all deliveries for which such a confirmation had not been
obtained would be gifts by the supplier to the customer from the legal point of
view . Such "confirmations" would then be made tradable, and banks could be69
required to organize monthly auctions of them. Obviously, since the "confirmations"
would not be all deposited at the banks as are "payment demand orders" under the
"kartoteka dva" system, it would be an entirely voluntary matter whether suppliers
delivered their unhonoured "confirmations" to the banks for auction or not.
It may be objected that a secondary market in IED involves a high degree of
moral hazard, in that debtors can affect the value of their own liabilities (by not
servicing them) and then buy them back at a lower value. However, it needs to be
remembered that because of the non-existence of an effective bankruptcy system,
debtors already have full control over the true value of their liabilities due to their
power to decide when (and whether) they will fulfil their obligations. The only choice
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facing creditors is whether to continue expanding the credit they have already
extended. If IED is securitized it is creditors' options which are expanded - not those
of debtors. Creditors can then obtain payment from their debtors' debtors at an
appropriate discount, and base their decision on whether to continue supplying a
particular customer on the effective price (net of discount) which they expect to
receive for the goods .70
9.  CONCLUSIONS
There are a large number of possible reasons for IED growth in PCEs. One can
distinguish healthy expansion of IED from the pathological (or excessive). The former
is mainly the result of previous repression of trade credit by central planners (an
example is IED growth in Czecho-Slovakia in 1990 and 1991). The latter occurs when
IED growth leads to a level of nominal transactions in the economy which is
unsustainable at the given money supply, velocity of circulation and relative prices
of domestic intermediate goods with respect to other goods. The FSU in 1992 and
Romania in 1991 seem to provide examples of such pathological IED expansion.
The most important cause of excessive IED growth seems to be a lack of
credibility of macroeconomic stabilization policy in the absence of an effective
bankruptcy system. In such a situation it is quite rational for firms to extend large
amounts of IEC, as long as implicit interest charges are included in the price. Thus
the fall in the real value of IED in Poland at the beginning of the stabilization
program suggests strongly that stabilization was credible in that country from the
very beginning. In countries in which stabilization is not credible an IED-price-IED
bubble can develop, leading to levels of transactions which cannot be sustained.
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If the authorities are determined to stabilize, but their will or ability is not
credible, what should they do to minimize the costs of incredible stabilization (which
will take the form of falls in output)? A one-off increase in the money supply, which
is the best solution from a purely technical point of view, is unlikely to be credible.
The greater money supply will merely be perceived as providing a higher base for
further IED expansion. Multilateral clearing of IED is no solution if nominal
transactions are already at an unsustainable level: further multilateral clearings or
increases in the money supply will be required in due course, if reductions of output
are to be avoided.
The least bad solution seems to be the forced securtization of IED, which
allows the development of secondary IED markets, enabling creditors to improve
their liquidity and debtors to improve their balance sheets. As a result the
unavoidable downward adjustment of nominal transactions to a level consistent with
the money supply should involve a greater reduction in prices and a smaller
reduction in output than otherwise. Above all, this solution involves no additional
liquidity provided to the economy from the outside. All that the authorities do is
make certain trades possible. Flexibility is increased without increasing liquidity. The
problem of establishing the credibility of the one-off nature of the intervention does
not, therefore, arise. Countries which still maintain the "payment demand order"
system and the "kartoteka dva" are particularly well placed to forcibly securitize IED
through regular auctions of unhonoured payment demand orders carried out by the
banks.
41
1. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics; School of Slavonic
and East European Studies, University of London; and Centre for Research into
Communist Economies.  I am grateful for comments to Marek Dabrowski and for
discussions with Fabrizio Coricelli and Geoffrey Davison.  The Centre for Economic
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council.
2. Peter Wiles [1973] describes it with regard to Yugoslavia.
3. The figures are those reported to the IMF by the Russian Government. According to
figures provided by the Bank of Latvia, in that country IED had reached 25 billion
rubles by June, showing that Latvia, which had traditionally accounted for about 1%
of the USSR's population and GDP, now accounted for approximately the same
proportion of IED.
4. In Poland the ratio of transactions to GNP in industry is about 2, and I am assuming
a similar ratio for Russia.
5. Hrincir and Klacek [1991] give the figure for January 1991 as 8.5% of GDP.
Assuming this to be the same as for December 1990 and taking the figures for the real
value of IED at the end of 1991 from Table 4, then we arrive at 18% if we accept a
10% fall in GDP during 1991. 
6. Calvo and Coricelli [1990] make the mistake of comparing end 1989 IED with
nominal GDP for 1989 as a whole, and get 47%. Since prices rose 740% (December
to December) during 1989 this is not suitable. I have crudely re-estimated 1989 GDP
in December 1989 prices by assuming that real output was the same in all twelve
months of that year. I get a value of 260 trillion zlotys (as opposed to the 100 trillion
Endnotes
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at average 1989 prices), and therefore an IED/GDP ratio of 18%.
7. C.Batchelor, Financial Times 11.2.1991.
8. Even if credit is formally free, interest can be effectively charged by being
incorporated in a higher price for the goods delivered, which the purchaser would
refuse to pay in the absence of the credit. 
9. Romania seems to be closer to the countries of the FSU in this respect than to Central
Europe. Thus at the end of 1991 IED amounted to 1.8 trillion lei, or 50% of GNP
[Kahn and Clifton 1992].
10. Russian data in Table 2 show the sharp fall in IED in July 1992 which resulted from
the effective closing of the "second file" on bank accounts to new payment demands
(see Section 8 for a description of the system). Banks were no longer obliged to
accept payment demands, with the result that the stock of IED on the "second file"
declined as old payment demands were honoured. The clearing exercise of August
then eliminated some 60% of the IED that remained. This does not, however, mean
that IED is now close to zero. It now merely takes the form of unregistered unpaid
invoices.
11. Delays are particularly long for payments between republics.
12. It is legal to pay for goods in cash, but it is not legal for banks to allow SOEs to
withdraw deposits in the form of cash except for specified, justified, purposes. These
include wage payments but exclude the payment of suppliers. Thus the expansion of
the use of cash in inter-enterprise transactions is severely inhibited. 
13. Thus, unlike in Russia, the shift to cash transfers probably helped to compensate the
Romanian economy for the slowdown in payments through the banking system, and
thus helped to mitigate the fall in output caused by growing arrears. This does not
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emerge clearly from Khan and Clifton [1992], who take the view that the shift into
cash delayed payments further, which seems unlikely in a country in which payments
through the banking system take between 15 and 21 days [Coricelli and Thorn, 1992].
14. The absence of bills of exchange and letters of credit appeared as much in Poland and
Czecho-Slovakia as in the FSU. Moreover, unsecuritized and uninstrumentalized trade
credit remains the norm in domestic transactions - as opposed to international ones -
in Western market economies (see footnote 6). 
15. Information from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.
16. Kahn and Clifton's failure to note this in the case of Romania is of a piece with their
mistaken belief that: "The rapid growth of arrears poses a serious policy problem in
all the transforming economies of Eastern Europe..".
17. Sometimes, as in Poland in 1990, there is also a reduction in the level of real bank
credit. See Calvo and Coricelli.
18. In Romania arrears were effectively indexed in 1991. When not paid on time,
suppliers would re-bill debtors at new higher prices [Khan and Clifton].
19. If one excludes the first month's once and for all price jump.
20. Bankruptcy laws are only a necessary, but far from sufficient, condition for the
existence of a bankruptcy system. If courts have no experience of bankruptcy cases
and of how to rule on their complexities a high "R&D" cost is borne by the first to
use them. Also there will be few, if any, trained liquidators for the courts to hire: in
Poland in mid-1991, i.e. 18 months into the big bang programme there were six such
people in the whole country.  
21. Taxes also have to be paid in money, but it may be possible to accumulate arrears
here also.
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22. I use this term so as to avoid the question of whether payments are made in cash or
bank money (which is not convertible into cash in the FSU).
23. As Begg and Portes point out there may also be a "strategic" reason for SOEs to
extend IEC. Those which are not "too big to fail" on their own, may hope to create
an interlocking network of inter-enterprise commitments, so that all the enterprises in
the IEC chain together are indeed "to big to fail", and the failure of any one SOE in
the network threatens the failure of all.
24. Thus Khan and Clifton report that in Romania as a result of the growth in IED the
income velocity of broad money rose from 1.8 in 1990 to 3.9 in September 1991. The
ratio of GDP to broad money plus gross IED (i.e. the income velocity of "liquidity")
was 1.7 in September 1992. In other words it had hardly changed compared to 1990,
when there was very little IED (see Table 5).
25. Note that within the ruble zone in 1992 enterprises could extend IEC to each other
across state boundaries.
26. As long as a is declining inflation can increase independently of increases in M and
V. 
27. Here, V is the velocity of circulation of money with respect to transactions financed
with the use of money (i.e. excluding those financed with the use of IED).
28. This may result from an anticipation of a natural increase in V as a result of increased
efficiency of the bank payments system as a result of reform in the absence of very
high inflation (this may have been the case in Czecho-Slovakia).
29. As long as SOEs' debt is not accepted as a means of payment by third parties. This
would presumably only happen to those enterprises which were scrupulous in meeting
their obligations on demand - i.e. to those SOEs which effectively became banks. This
45
is unlikely to happen in many cases. 
30. The nominal prices of primary inputs and final outputs then jump up by 1/a, as do the
prices of intermediate inputs.
31. See Section 5.
32. In the absence of increases in money stock or velocity.
33. Price overshooting both relative to government expectations and "objective
overshooting" which requires downward price adjustments after initial increases. This
process cannot, of course, be the only reason for price overshooting in PCEs since we
have seen that IED expansion was not a major source of liquidity growth in either
Poland or Czecho-Slovakia in the aftermath of "big bang" stabilization. Moreover,in
these two countries the "bust" phase followed immediately upon stabilization rather
than with some delay, as one would expect if the main cause of recession were
excessive IED expansion in the face of tight monetary policy. Such a mechanism may,
however, be part of the explanation of output declines in Romania in 1991 and Russia
in 1992.
34. An alternative would be the banning of IED and the return to physical command
planning. It is interesting how few people suggest this at present. This is probably due
in the FSU to the main opposition to stabilization coming at present from the
industrial lobby. That lobby has no desire to see a return to direct control from the
centre. Rather, it wishes the freedom of a market economy without the need to control
costs. The impossibility of businesses functioning effectively in a hyperinflation [see
Auerbach, Davison and Rostowski 1992] has not yet been understood by many
industrial managers. 
35. Calvo [1992], therefore suggests wage (and possibly price!) control as a way of
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ensuring that the real value of additional bank credit is not eroded by inflation. The
question is whether wage control can be effective in the face of expansionary
monetary policy (for it is of that which we speak). Price controls are unlikely to be
a good idea in PCEs, whose distorted relative price structures are an important source
of waste.
36. It is not clear what the incentives would be for the employees of such an institution
to brave the opprobrium which liquidating enterprises would bring on them - and all
for the benefit of the net creditor enterprises.
37. The rest was financed by credit from the banking system of which about 10
percentage points came from the National Bank of Romania [Khan and Clifton].
38. As happened in Russia in September 1992 and in Romania in June 1991.
39. In fact, since "multilateral clearing" takes place in time, new IED would be contracted
even as the clearing was taking place. 
40. A similar thing happened in Romania in May and June 1991, when banks extended
15.5 billion lei in credits to enterprises on special accounts which were to be used
exclusively to pay off arrears, and were then to be repaid to the National Bank of
Romania. They never were repaid. In Russia, as a result of this change it is not clear
at present what the status of net debits on the IED clearing accounts is. Some 300
billion rubles worth of the net positive balances on these accounts was used to pay tax
arrears in September of 1992, significantly improving the appearance of the Russia's
budgetary accounts (information supplied by the Russian Ministry of Finance).
41. We need to distinguish between increasing M so that the existing level of PT can be
financed and attempting to increase M sufficiently to eliminate IED altogether. Trying
to do the latter implies an even looser posture. This is because M has then to increase
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sufficiently to finance PT AND to pay off all IED.
42. Naturally, if not all IED can be cleared multilaterally then the failure to provide the
bank credit required to clear the IED of net creditors will result in PT having to fall
from P'T', and would make this option less expansionary than either increasing M or
multilaterally clearing IED and supplying bank credit to clear net debtors' IED.
43. IED would stabilize only if there were some maximum IED/M ratio above which
SOEs were not prepared to expand IED. Furthermore, if there are net debtors whose
position is hopeless - i.e. SOEs whose net IED already exceeds all their assets, and
who are therefore inevitable bankrupts - these would be willing to take on unlimited
quantities of additional IED, concentrating the net debts of all SOEs in their own
hands. In this way they gain the possibility of effectively creating money. This would
give a new twist to the usual situation in which central banks cannot go bankrupt -
here bankrupts would temporarily become central banks! Non bankrupt net debtors
would not need to deliver goods of any significant value to the bankrupts - they would
merely need to invoice them appropriately. In this situation net creditors would try to
escape their exposed position, and this would act as the only brake on IED expansion.
Yet, it is a rather weak break, given the difficulty a net creditor has in reducing IEC
unilaterally.
44. The limit on note issue was banks' need to maintain convertibility into gold. Overissue
was possible, however, in the sense that convertibility could become threatened.
45. This could then feed through to lower demand for primary inputs in real terms, so that
the prices of these could also rise. 
46. IED, effectively inconvertible into money, would thus play a role which was similar
to non-cash money in the FSU in contributing to stagflation [Lipton and Sachs].
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47. As Khan and Clifton do. The money supply increased as a result of the clearing
exercise of January 1992 by only 17%.
48. This in itself is then a basis for creditors to enforce payments through the courts. The
World Bank has, following its usual dirigiste instinct, effectively approved this
approach: it has made its Structural Adjustment Loan to Romania subject to the
condition that IED should not exceed 7.5% of SOE turnover [Khan and Clifton]. 
49. In real terms the level of IED in June 1992 was 40% of that in June 1991. However,
real bank credit was also less than 50% of its June 1991 level.  
50. The inflationary effects of 15 central banks in a single currency area have already
been observed in the FSU - the effects of tens of thousands of emission centres can
readily be imagined.
51. However, if the authorities succeeded in refusing to maintain the liquidity of net
creditors, then SOEs would probably become very careful not to extend any IEC in
the future, which would ensure that the IED problem did not recur for quite some
time. The question is whether there is any benefit in having net creditors' illiquidity
legitimized in this way? 
52. Indexation would make the debtor's position worse than it is at present in Russia,
where real interest rates on IED are massively negative. 
53. There may also be further effects due to the tax system. Thus in Poland, until the
second half of 1991 penal interest rates due (but not paid) on IEC counted as part of
the supplier's revenue - but not as part of the purchaser's costs!
54. The fact that commercial bills need to be endorsed by two or more non-bank firms
before being discounted by a bank means that they can constitute a sophisticated
mechanism for assessing the creditworthiness of the issuer.
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55. A modest proposal regarding what to do even in this situation, so as to help the
secondary market in IED to develop, is put forward at the end of Section 8.
56. This does not happen in the case of net debtors if we have multilateral clearing
without bank credit injection, but as we have seen in Section 5, such a system creates
strong incentives for there to be few of these. 
57. Of course, lowering the price may attract new, credible, customers.
58. Also final goods producers may find that by reducing their prices they cause their
suppliers to doubt their ability to pay, which may cause these suppliers to cut them
off, rather than to reduce their own prices. 
59. In practice some increase in the money supply might be countenanced. This would
need to be less than the preceding price increases so that the real money stock should
fall, first, in order to ensure the disappearance of any monetary overhang which might
exist, and second, so as not to accommodate all of the SOEs' "price push".
60. These would be set off against each other at par, although they would have been
bought by their current owners at varying discounts depending on the status of the
debtor (see the description of the auction system suggested below).
61. This gives us an additional reason as to why SOEs might decide to keep prices high
in the absence of a secondary IED market. Doing so may not improve one's cash flow
compared to price reductions, but it signals to suppliers that one continues to consider
the current credit crunch as temporary, and that once it is reversed one's IED will be
of manageable proportions.
62. However, the nominal value of bank debt owed by SOEs could not be reduced.
63. The "first file" (kartoteka odin) consists of paid payment demands. In the traditional
system the payment demands in the "kartoteka dva" were paid in strict chronological
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order as money became available. Nowadays, even where the payment demand system
has survived, enterprises have the right to decide in which order the payment demands
should be met. 
64. As the system proved effective ever "younger" payment demands could be forcibly
securitized in this way.
65. Clearly some players will be more liquidity constrained than others, but this in itself
is an important piece of information.
66. This was still the case in Poland two years into the reforms.
67. On a purely technical note: evidence of delivery of goods, confirmed by the purchaser
and accompanying the payment demand, should be required for its validity to be
accepted by the banking system and the courts. Suppliers could avoid forced
securitization in this way, however, only at the cost of loosing all legal claim to
payment. Suppliers can, furthermore, avoid securitization by setting the reserve price
of their IEC at its nominal value. To discourage this one could require the original
owners to actually pay in money for their own IEC if it failed to reach the reserve
price, so that they would loose the use of the money involved for a certain amount of
time. 
68. Khan and Clifton's view that IED is a contingent liability of the budget because SOEs
belong to the state is mistaken. In market socialist economies, such as are most PCEs,
the state's liability in SOEs is limited, whether these are formally limited liability
nationalised firms or the more traditional "state enterprise" (with or without workers'
control). 
69. In the 1970s in Yugoslavia the so-called "weksel" was introduced as a confirmation
of delivery. 
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70. Thus the shorter the period of delay before IED is auctioned the better from the
supplier's point of view.
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TABLE 1
Possible Causes of Output Collapse in the Economies in Transition
                                                                                                         
Cause Countries
                                                                                                         
External demand:
- exogenous decline Bulgaria, Hungary
CSFR, Poland, Romania
East Germany
- overvalued currency East Germany
Internal demand:
- Keynesian CSFR, Poland?
- FX shortage Bulgaria, Romania, FSU,
- Demand shift CSFR, Poland
- Unwanted goods Russia, all
Supply:
- Exogenous shocks Russian oil
- Uneconomic output Widespread
- Input dislocation FSU
- Credit squeeze Poland? CSFR? Hungary?




Credit and Inter-enterprise arrears in Russia 1992
(billions of rubles)
                                                                                                         
End Nominal Real Nominal Real Arrears/
Month bank bank arrears arrears bank credit
credit credit
                                                                                                         
12 1991  450 450   39   39 0.078
1  1992  510 148  141   41 0.277
2  1992  700 147  390   82 0.558
3  1992  920 149  800  129 0.870
4  1992 1050 139 1800  239 1.710
5  1992 1050 125 2050  243 1.952
6  1992 1400 140 3000  299 2.143
7  1992 2300 207 1190  107 0.517
                                                                                                         
Source: Russian Centre for Economic Reform.
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TABLE 3
Credit and Inter-enterprise arrears in Poland 1989-92
(trillions of zlotys)
                                                                                                         
Month Nominal Real Nominal Real Arrears/
bank bank arrears arrears* bank credit
credit credit*
                                                                                                         
12 1988#   11.1 11.11    7.0  7.00   0.63
 3 1989+   13.0 10.00    6.8  5.20   0.52
 6 1989+   15.3  9.46    9.2  5.68   0.60
 9 1989+   21.5  6.49   15.9  4.80   0.74  
12 1989   30.7  4.15   47.4  6.41   1.54
 1 1990   30.2  2.27   50.3  3.78   1.67
 2 1990   37.7  2.28   66.1  4.01   1.75
 3 1990   44.8  2.61   75.1  4.37   1.68
 6 1990   70.7  3.54   81.5  4.08   1.15
 9 1990   95.5  4.33   77.3  3.51   0.81
12 1990  113.1  4.38  103.0  3.99   0.91
 3 1991  133.8  4.11  109.1  3.35   0.82
 6 1991  154.5  4.30  126.2  3.52   0.82
 9 1991  178.1  4.72  143.0  3.79   0.80
12 1991  192.0  4.65  179.8  4.35   0.94
 3 1992  208.3  4.52  177.1  3.48   0.85
 6 1992  220.2  4.35  190.6  3.77   0.87
                                                                                                         
Source: GUS, 1992.   
# Calvo and Coricelli, 1990. 
+ Coricelli and Thorne, 1992.
* In December 1988 zlotys
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TABLE 4
Credit and Inter-enterprise arrears in CSFR 1989-91
(billions of crowns)
                                                                                                         
Month Nominal Real Nominal Real Arrears/
bank bank arrears* arrears bank credit
credit credit
                                                                                                         
12 1989   578 578    7    7    0.012
 3 1990   569 569   11   11    0.019
 6 1990   579 579   14   14    0.024
 9 1990   588 588   28   28    0.048
12 1990   583 490   54   45    0.093
 3 1991   618 358   77   53    0.125
 6 1991   664 367  123   68    0.185
 9 1991   694 391  147   83    0.212
12 1991   732 407  155   86    0.212
                                                                                                         
Source: Begg and Portes [1992].
* These are overdue arrears. Before the beginning of the transition, normal terms of
payment in Czechoslovakia were one month, so that at end 1989 the ratio of total
arrears (overdue and not overdue) to bank credit was about 0.2. Since normal terms
of payment do not seem to have changed during the transition, and at the end of
1991 overdue arrears were equivalent to one month's payment lag [Schaffer,1992], the
ratio of total arrears to bank credit at the end of 1991 was 0.4. As a result total
arrears/bank credit and the real value of total arrears increased significantly less
between end 1989 and end 1991 than follows from the table.
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TABLE 5
Credit and Inter-enterprise arrears in Romania 1990-92
(billions of lei)
                                                                                                         
Month Nominal Real Nominal Real Arrears/
bank bank arrears arrears* bank credit
credit credit*
                                                                                                         
12 1990  684 486  100   71    0.146
 3 1991  756 419  400  222    0.529
 6 1991  811 332  600  245    0.740
 9 1991  749 235  800  250    1.068
12 1991  954 215 1777  400    1.863
 3 1992 1270 193  400+   61    0.316
 6 1992 1274 158  800+   99    0.627
                                                                                                         
Source: Khan and Clifton [1992].
International Financial Statistics, IMF, for prices.
+ National Bank of Romania.
* In October 1990 lei.
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